AXIOMATIZING KRIPKE'S THEORY OF TRUTH
Abstract. We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's [18] theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense; only the sentences provably true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF and conjectured that the detour through classical logic in KF is dispensable. We refute Reinhardt's Conjecture, and provide a direct axiomatization PKF of Kripke's theory in partial logic. We argue that any natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory in Strong Kleene logic has the same proof-theoretic strength as PKF, namely the strength of ramified analysis RA <ω ω or a system of Tarskian ramified truth up to ω ω and thus any such axiomatization is much weaker than Feferman's axiomatization KF in classical logic, which is equivalent to ramified analysis RA< 0 up to 0.
Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen. adapted from Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus 7 §1. Introduction: Reinhardt's interpretation of Kripke's theory of truth. There have been various attempts to block the inconsistency arising from the liar paradox by allowing sentences not to have have a single classical truth value. In particular, on these accounts the liar sentence will not receive a single classical truth value true or false. The presence of sentences that lack a truth value, that have more than one truth value or that have a non-classical truth value requires an alternative to classical logic to deal with these sentences. Presumably the best known approach in this vein is Kripke's [18] theory developed in Outline of a theory of truth. Kripke studies partial models for a language containing a truth predicate. The models are partial in the sense that sentences containing the truth predicate may fail to receive a truth value.
More precisely, by an inductive construction Kripke defined models of partial logic extending standard models where ϕ and T ϕ have the same truth value for all sentences ϕ, even if they contain the truth predicate. ϕ and T ϕ will be either both true or both false or they will both lack a truth value.
1 In these models the liar sentence λ as well as ¬λ and T λ lack a truth value. Kripke considered various options for assigning truth values to complex sentences containing sentences that lack a truth value. Among these, Strong the Kleene 2 AXIOMATIZING KRIPKE'S THEORY OF TRUTH valuation scheme appeared to be very natural; subsequently we shall focus on Kripke's account based on Strong Kleene logic.
For various reasons it has been thought to be desirable to have an axiomatization of Kripke's theory. We do not go over those reasons here; we just mention that they range from attempts to explicate our intuitive notion of truth to assigning the truth predicate a rule in the foundations of mathematics.
However, Kripke's theory does not lend itself very easily to a straightforward axiomatization. As the models obtained by Kripke are partial, a formal system describing Kripke's models would have to be formulated not in classical logic but in a formal system of partial logic. Although this is feasible (see, e.g., Kremer [17] ), such systems have not become very popular; they were often rejected as unpractical and not suitable for the rôle that had been assigned to them in larger research programs.
Kripke had already hinted at a solution to the problem: 2 he played with the idea of 'closing off' fixed points. 3 In the simplest case, in order to 'close off' a partial model, one puts all sentences lacking a truth value in the antiextension of the truth predicate, that is, sentences without truth value are pronounced to be false. Whereas the interpretation of the truth predicate in the partial model partitioned the set of sentences into three sets (true, false and undefined), the new 'closed off' model is purely classical because the interpretation of the truth predicate simply divides the set of sentences into those to which the truth predicate applies and into those to which it does not apply.
Relying on this classical modification of Kripke's account, Feferman [9] devised an elegant and very natural looking formalization of Kripke's fixed point models in classical logic. 4 The resulting system is commonly known as KF. Natural models for KF are the 'closed off' versions of Kripke's fixed point models. Thus the axioms of KF-at least without axiom CONS below-describe a positive inductive definition.
KF and its variants were closely scrutinized by various logicians (e.g., Feferman [9] , Cantini [2, 4] ) and advocated as philosophically significant accounts of truth (e.g., McGee [21, 22] , and Soames [30] ). But adopting classical logic for axiomatizations of Kripke's theory yields certain awkward and unintended consequences. We shall look at the drawbacks of the use of classical logic in axiomatizing Kripke's theory below in some detail.
Reinhardt has asked whether there is an instrumentalist justification of KF. In particular, he has posed the problem whether KF can be viewed as a tool for producing theorems that would also be derivable in a direct formalization of Kripke's theory in partial logic, if one focuses on the sentences that are provably true in KF. We shall answer Reinhardt's Problem negatively.
2 See Kripke [18, p. 80-81] (The page numbers refer to the reprinted version of Kripke's paper.) 3 Kripke denied explicitly that he is departing from classical logic. See footnote 18 of Kripke [18] . Especially this last point has puzzled scores of commentators. See, e.g., Visser [31, p. 640-642] . 4 Feferman gives Kripke's minimal fixed point model as the main example of a model for his theory. His theory, however, does not feature an axiom excluding any other fixed point. Cantini This result is still compatible with a much weaker claim concerning the innocence of the move to classical logic: it is not yet ruled out that KF and a direct axiomatization of truth in partial logic share many properties. In particular, one might conjecture that both serve a similar rôle in foundational issues. Even if KF and an axiomatization partial logic differ with respect to their truththeoretic content, both may still yield the same non-semantic consequences; more precisely, they might yield the same consequences or consequences of the same proof-theoretic strength, if all sentences containing the truth predicate are neglected. We shall demonstrate that also this hope has to be given up. To this end we shall present an axiomatization PKF of Kripke's theory in partial logic. We claim that any natural axiomatizations of Kripke's theory in Strong Kleene logic logic will be equivalent to our system PKF.
We determine the proof-theoretic strength of PKF as that of ramified analysis RA <ω ω up to ω ω . In contrast, KF is much stronger; Feferman [9] has shown that it is equivalent to ramified analysis RA < 0 up to 0 . This result shows that axiomatizing Kripke's theory in the most natural way leads to a system that is much weaker than the classical system KF. In particular, the arithmetical content of both theories is far from identical.
From this we conclude that there is no justification of KF that relies on a reduction of KF to a natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory in partial logic. This does not preclude the existence of a justification of KF by other means, but seen as a natural theory of truth PKF seems to be preferable over KF.
Our proof-theoretic analysis sheds also some light on the classification of axiomatizations of Kripke's theory with respect to other theories of truth. For instance, autonomously iterated theories of classical truth are by far stronger than axiomatizations of Kripke's theory.
Note on notation. We assume that ¬, ∧, ∨, ∀ and ∃ are our only primitive logical symbols, while all other logical symbols are defined. = is the only predicate symbol of the language L PA of arithmetic. Adding the unary symbol T for the truth predicate to L PA yields the language L T . In contrast to several other authors, we do not employ an additional primitive predicate for falsity of a sentence, which can be defined in our framework as the truth of the negation of the respective sentence.
If ϕ is a formula, ϕ will be used for the numeral of the Gödel number of ϕ. If ϕ(x) has the free variable, ϕ(ẋ) stands for the result of formally replacing the variable x in ϕ(x) by the numeral with value x.
The notation here differs only slightly from Feferman [9] . Var(x), ClTerm(x), Sent(x) and For(x, v) are natural representations of the sets of codes of all variables, closed terms, all sentences of L T , and formulas with only the variable v free. The function val(x) takes (codes of) terms to what they denote. ¬ . represents the function that sends the code of a formula to the code of its negation. Thus PA will prove ¬ . ϕ = ¬ϕ for all formulas of L T . ∀ . represents the function that takes the code of a variable and of a formula and yields (the code of) the universal quantification of the formula by the variable. x(ẏ/v) is a function expression that takes the code of a formula, a number and a variable and gives the code of the formula where the numeral of y is substituted for the variable in the formula. Thus KF8 below, for instance, says that a universally quantified sentence ∀xϕ(x) of L T is true if and only if all of its instances ϕ(n) are true. Here n is the numeral of n.
Analogous remarks apply to other underdotted symbols. We may assume that Peano arithmetic contains function symbols for all these primitive recursive operations and all required defining equations as axioms. If the language of arithmetic does not include these symbols the function can be expressed by suitable formulas of course.
In order to fix the notation, we state some features of Kripke's construction. N is the standard model arithmetic. (N, S 1 , S 2 ) is the partial expansion of N to the language L T , where T is assigned the extension S 1 and the antiextension S 2 . We always assume S 1 ∪ S 2 ⊆ ω. The model (N, S 1 , S 2 ) is partial in the sense that there might be sentences not in S 1 ∪ S 2 .
As mentioned above we use the Strong Kleene scheme for the evaluation of complex sentences in a partial model (see also, for instance, McGee [21] ):
(i) (N, S 1 , S 2 ) |= SK ϕ iff ϕ is a true atomic or negated atomic arithmetical sentence (ii) (N, S 1 , S 2 ) |= SK T t iff t is a closed term with value n ∈ S 1 (iii) (N, S 1 , S 2 ) |= SK ¬ T t iff t is a closed term with value n ∈ S 2 (iv) (N,
In particular we have the following equivalences for all numerals n of the respective numbers n:
If n ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 neither T n nor ¬ T n holds in the partial model (N, S 1 , S 2 ). The operator Φ (the Kripke jump) is defined on pairs of sets (S 1 , S 2 ) of sentences as follows:
is a fixed point model iff Φ(S 1 , S 2 ) = (S 1 , S 2 ). Kripke showed that there are many different fixed point models.
Fixed points of the operator Φ are characterized by the following attractive property of the interpretation of the truth predicate:
is a fixed point model if and only if the following holds:
As has been mentioned above, by 'closing off' one can convert a partial model (N, S 1 , S 2 ) into the classical model (N, S 1 ). The latter is simply the expansion of the standard model N to the language L T where T is assigned the interpretation S 1 . In this model (N, S 1 ), ¬ T n holds for all n ∈ S 1 whether they are in S 2 or not. Thus closing off is the generation of a classical model by merging the set of false sentences with the set of all 'gappy' sentences.
These 'closed off' models are the intended models for the Kripke-Feferman theory KF. KF is formulated in classical logic. KF comprises all axioms of Peano arithmetic PA including all induction axioms in the language with the truth predicate. The truth-theoretic axioms of KF are given in the following list:
There are several alternative versions of KF. Feferman's [9] own formulation appeared in print after several other variants of KF had been published. Feferman uses the label Ref(PA) for what we call KF. As far as we know, Reinhardt [27] introduced was the first to call the system KF. Cantini [2] uses the designation for a similar system with restricted induction.
Of course, KF is sound with respect to 'closed off' models:
Proposition 2 (Feferman, Reinhardt). If KF ϕ, then ϕ holds in all (classical) closed off fixed point models.
Therefore KF is sound with respect to Kripke's original theory in the following sense:
Proposition 3. If KF T ϕ , then ϕ holds in all fixed point models.
The axiomatization of a partial notion of truth in classical logic (or the 'closingoff' of Kripke's partial models) yields several oddities, which make KF hardly in itself acceptable as an a natural and intuitively plausible theory of truth. In particular, KF proves that some of its own theorems are not true. KF, so to speak, disproves its own soundness. an example for this is the liar sentence:
Remark 4. KF proves λ and ¬ T λ .
Proof. The liar sentence is of the form ¬ T l where l is a closed term with
From CONS we also have T l → ¬ T ¬ . l. Therefore KF proves ¬ T l, that is, KF proves the liar sentence. CONS is essential in the proof that KF proves the liar sentence λ. In section 2 we shall argue that dropping CONS is not an attractive option either. Obviously, the provability of the liar sentence renders KF implausible as a natural formalization of Kripke's theory. The attractiveness of Kripke's theory is due to the fact that it does not make the liar sentence truth or false.
Apart from these well known drawbacks of KF, the proof of the liar sentence in KF reveals that the notion of truth axiomatized by KF is not compositional. The truth of the liar sentence in KF does not supervene on the truth of a subsentence or somehow subordinated sentence; rather it is an artifact of the axiomatization of Kripke's theory of partial truth in classical logic.
Reinhardt [27, p. 242-243] pointed out that the status of the liar sentence in PKF and several other odd consequences of the use of classical logic make the system KF thoroughly unsatisfactory as it stands, for it proves sentences (such as λ) which by its own lights are untrue. Reinhardt argued that one ought to unwaveringly adhere to the partial party line. 5 On the partial account, λ can neither be asserted nor denied, because it is neither true nor false. So an axiomatization of this account should prove neither λ (or, equivalently, ¬ T λ ) nor ¬λ. In view of this, Reinhardt considered the theory
This theory IKF is called the inner logic of KF. So the unattractive aspect of KF that was discussed above can be generalized by saying that the outer logic of KF (i.e., KF itself) differs from its inner logic. 6 Reinhardt thought that IKF captures the thoroughly partial core of Kripke's theory of truth, which is underlined by the soundness result Proposition 3. At any rate, it is free of the problem that was seen to haunt KF, for we see that for all sentences ϕ:
Moreover, if a sentence ϕ is an element of IKF, then ϕ is true in all fixed point models. Reinhardt saw KF as no more than an instrument, as a machine for generating the honest-to-God theorems of IKF. He put this as follows: Reinhardt's Problem. Is there for every KF-theorem of the form T ϕ , a KF-proof
Reinhardt's program and Hilbert's program differ in some respects essentially: The ideal and the real statements are syntactically distinguished in the latter case, while the inner and the outer logic of KF are formulated in exactly the same language. Also we do not want to go into the discussion whether a purely instrumentalist understanding of Hilbert's programme is adequate. It is not hard to see, however, that Reinhardt's version of Hilbert's program suffers the same fate as that of Hilbert's program. 7 Theorem 7 shows that in many cases, the detour via 'ideal' statements to prove 'real' theorems of KF is essential. In order to prove the Theorem 7, we first need two lemmata.
This standard lemma is easily proved by a metainduction on the buildup of ϕ.
Proof. It is not hard to see that none of the axioms KF3-CONS holds in a partial fixed point model. For instance, the liar sentence λ lacks a truth value in all fixed point models, as does T λ and T ¬¬λ . Therefore T ¬¬λ ↔ T λ does not receive a truth value in any fixed point model. Consequently KF3 does not hold in any such model by the soundness of KF, that is, Proposition 3. Thus
Similarly all other axioms KF3-CONS cannot occur in the proof ϕ 1 , ...ϕ n , ϕ. The only axioms in the proof that involve the truth predicate may be KF1, KF2, certain induction axioms and KF14. Given such a proof, replace any occurrence of T by Tr 0 in this proof, where Tr 0 is the usual truth definition in L PA of atomic sentences of L PA . It is not hard to check that KF1, KF2, all induction axioms and KF14 become theorems of PA. Thus the resulting structure of sentences can easily be complemented to a proof in PA.
This lemma solves Reinhardt's Problem:
Proof. KF is not conservative over PA. Feferman [9] has determined the proof-theoretic strength of KF: it is arithmetically equivalent to ramified analysis up to 0 (RA < 0 ). For our purposes a mundane example will do: KF Con PA . From Lemma 5 we obtain KF T Con PA . Thus Con PA ∈ IKF holds, but since PA Con PA by Gödel's theorem, there is no proof ϕ 1 , ...ϕ n , Con PA of KF such that for all i ≤ n, ϕ i ∈ IKF because of the preceding lemma.
In fact, this theorem can be strengthened somewhat. 8 Let us define strict KF (SKF) to be just like KF, except that the truth predicate is not allowed to appear in the induction axioms. The inner logic of SKF (strict IKF) is denoted by SIKF. It is argued in McGee [22] that SKF is an interesting theory, particularly for disquotationalists.
SKF is a conservative extension of PA (see Cantini [2] ). Thus Con PA is not a theorem of SKF. So if we want to prove theorem 7 for SKF instead of for KF, we cannot use Con PA . Nevertheless, another example is not hard to find: Theorem 8. For some ϕ ∈ SIKF, there exists no proof ϕ 1 , ...ϕ n , ϕ of SKF such that for all i ≤ n, ϕ i ∈ SIKF.
Proof. We can use the same interpretation as in Lemma 6. That is, we replace in any such proof the truth predicate by Tr 0 . This shows also that T ∀x(x = x) is not provable in KF by a proof consisting entirely of members of IKF, even though ∀x(x = x) is in SIKF.
Yet another theory that one might consider is the version of KF where the truth axioms are formulated as axiom schemes. If for this theory one considers the corresponding inner logic and poses Reinhardt's question, the answer is not so straightforward. In comparison to full KF, schematic KF is again quite weak: it is not hard to see that schematic KF is arithmetically conservative over PA. The proof of Theorem 8 carries over to schematic KF as well. §2. The consistency axiom. The consistency axiom CONS enabled us to prove the liar sentence in KF and, consequently, to prove in KF that the liar sentence is not true. This asymmetry between inner and outer logic provided a strong reason for rejecting KF itself as a plausible theory of truth and for concentrating on the internal logic of KF. Now one might surmise that we too hastily rejected classical logic and that dropping CONS from the list of axioms might already dissolve our worries about KF.
Also CONS differs in several respects from the axioms KF1-KF13 and has a peculiar status among the other truth-theoretic axioms of KF. CONS does not form part of a positive inductive clause. CONS may be rephrased as
Thus it claims one half of an equivalence. Adding the full equivalence would render KF inconsistent. Thus, while all axioms KF1-KF13 are in a sense compositional, CONS is not a compositional axiom (cf. Halbach [14] and below).
Moreover, as has been shown in Remark 4, CONS forces the inner and the outer logic of KF to be different. Adding to KF a rule that even implies that the inner logic contains the outer logic renders KF inconsistent. Such a rule of 'necessitation' would allow to conclude T ϕ from ϕ. For CONS allows to prove T ϕ → ϕ for all sentences (see, e.g., Cantini [4, p. 54, Theorem 8.8(i)]) and this reflection scheme is inconsistent with the above mentioned rule of necessitation by Montague's theorem (see Montague [23] ).
Since CONS differs so much from the other axioms, several authors have preferred to drop CONS from KF. In particular McGee [22] advocates KF without CONS as a theory of truth that should be useful to the disquotationalist.
CONS excludes truth value gluts by saying that no sentence is true together with its negation. By dropping this postulate one cannot rule out such gluts any longer. Several authors-most prominently Visser [31] -have expanded Kripke's theory to a four-valued logic, more precisely, they allow the extension and antiextension of the truth predicate to overlap. Cantini [2] has investigated KF without CONS and its relation with fixed point models with gluts and gaps.
Although several annoying pathologies are removed from KF by dropping CONS, also some desirable features of KF are also lost. In particular, the truth predicate does not distribute any longer over the material conditional. That is, the use of CONS is essential in establishing
for any two sentences ϕ and ψ of L T . Of course, material implication is defined here in the usual way: ϕ → ψ stands for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. Without CONS we could not even prove the corresponding rule.
Of course dropping CONS from the list of the KF-axioms does not render the inner and outer logic identical; the inner and the outer logic will be still different. In particular, the inner logic still will not comprise all classical tautologies. But KF does not only fall short of proving the same theorems in its inner and outer logic, one cannot even consistently postulate on the basis of KF that the inner and outer logic are identical. For in order to force the identity of inner and outer logic one might try to add the following two rules for all sentences ϕ ∈ L T :
Adding these two rules to KF yields an inconsistency even if CONS is dropped from the list of axioms.
Lemma 9. KF without axiom CONS but with the two rules NEC and CONEC is inconsistent.
Proof. If λ is the liar sentence with PA λ ↔ ¬ T λ , the following two sentences are theorems of PA:
By applying NEC to these two sentences and distributing the truth predicate over ∨ with KF6, respectively, we obtain the following sentences:
KF12 can be used for simplifying (1) to T λ , while (2) yields T ¬λ with KF13. From T λ ∧ T ¬λ we obtain using KF4 the sentence T λ ∧ ¬λ An application of CONEC yields an inconsistency.
In sum, not only is KF without CONS not closed under NEC and CONEC: it cannot be consistently closed under these rules. So removing CONS from KF does not solve the problem that Reinhardt has pointed out. §3. Reinhardt's Challenge. Following Reinhardt, we shall focus on deductive theories that are valid in partial fixed point models. KF is not sound with respect to partial fixed point models, only Reinhardt's instrumentalist interpretation could render it useful for our purposes. Concentrating on IKF initially sounds like a promising idea for obtaining a suitable deductive theory. From the definition of IKF it follows that IKF is a recursively enumerable set of sentences, so it is recursively axiomatizable by Craig's method [6] .
The acceptability of this theory, however, relies on the acceptability of the classical system KF. One could draw a dramatic parallel to reductive programs in the foundations of mathematics again: One could take the set of arithmetical sentences provable in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory as one's theory of arithmetic (using the usual embedding of arithmetic in set theory); this could hardly be considered as satisfactory axiomatization of arithmetic, which ought to be direct.
In a similar way IKF is not a satisfactory axiomatization of Kripke's theory of truth, because it relies on a system that is not directly sound with respect to Kripke's theory. IKF in combination with Craig's trick does not produce a list of sentences that are even candidates for being basic principles of truth.
9 Therefore Reinhardt [26, p. 239 ] put it as a challenge to find a natural axiomatization of IKF which is not obviously parasitic on the untrustworthy system KF.
In this paper, we provide a direct axiomatization of Kripke's theory. This implies that our system is formulated in partial logic, and not in classical logic as KF. 10 The central, but necessarily tentative claim of the present paper is that this is the natural way to axiomatize Kripke's theory of truth with the Strong Kleene scheme over Peano arithmetic. We take this as evidence that Reinhardt's Challenge cannot be met.
The uniqueness claim that our system is actually the only natural formalization of Kripke's theory is to be understood up to reaxiomatization. That is, any natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory in partial logic will yield the same theorems. Actually for our purposes a weaker claim would suffice, we only need to claim uniqueness up to proof-theoretic equivalence, because we are interested in the proof-theoretic strength of the natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory. For we are interested in a comparison of our system with the classical alternative KF and with the usual subsystem of Second Order arithmetic. Which notion of proof-theoretic equivalence is applicable should become evident below.
Of course we cannot mathematically prove our uniqueness claim, because the notion of a natural axiomatization has not been mathematically captured. We hope that our system will make our claim plausible, but we shall not fatigue the reader by providing alternative approaches and subsequently proving that the systems yield actually the same theorems.
By axiomatizing Kripke's theory of truth in partial logic, we will ensure that, in accordance with Reinhardt's strictures, the inner logic and the outer logic of the resulting system coincide.
In the following sections we describe our formal system for generating sentences that hold in all fixed point models in Strong Kleene logic. §4. Strong Kleene logic and arithmetic in the sequent calculus. We employ a sequent calculus for Strong Kleene logic. Our system is Scott's [28] with slight modifications. For an alternative approach see Aoyama's [1] . Later we shall add specific rules for arithmetic and truth.
The system can easily be rewritten as a natural deduction system. The formulas before ⇒ are then treated as assumptions. The natural deduction version may be more natural, because it can dispense with the sequent arrow ⇒, which is much different from the conditional → of the objectlanguage, but for technical purposes the sequent calculus is preferable. We will return to this point below.
4.1. Logic. Sequents are conceived as given by a finite pair Γ and ∆ of sets of formulas. The sequent is written as Γ ⇒ ∆. If Γ and ∆ are sets of sentences and Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable, our system PKF is sound in the sense that if all sentences in Γ are true, then at least one sentence in ∆ is true, and if all sentences in ∆ are false, then at least one sentence in Γ is false.
4.1.1. Structural rules and initial sequents. All sequents of one of the following forms are initial sequents:
Laws of truth values. Scott is using constants for the truth values. For our purposes it is more convenient not to expand the language. is the sentence 0=0, ⊥ the sentence 0 = 1 and λ is the liar sentence (that is a sentence that is "gappy" under the intended interpretation). The following sequents are then initial sequents:
In the last line and in the following the double arrow indicates that both, λ ⇒ ¬λ and ¬λ ⇒ λ are initial sequents. This convention will also be applied below.
4.1.3. Laws of negation. If Γ is a set of sentences, ¬Γ designates the set of all negations of sentences in Γ.
The usual rules for ¬ introduction are not sound, that is, for instance, one cannot bring a single formula from the antecedent to the succedent by affixing a negation symbol to the formula. If ϕ is a sentence lacking a truth value, ϕ ⇒ ϕ is sound in the sense explained above, but ⇒ ϕ, ¬ϕ is not sound.
4.1.4. Laws of ∨ and ∧. Scott employs here an additional connective × ×, which is dispensable here.
4.1.5. Laws of quantifiers. For the quantifiers we have the following initial sequents and rules:
x not free in lower sequent (∃2) 4.1.6. Laws of Identity. We also add initial sequents for identity for arbitrary terms s and t:
The transitivity and symmetry follow from these initial sequents in the usual way.
The following theorem states that these initial sequents and rules are sound with respect to the intended notion of logical consequence in Strong Kleene logic. It is proved by a routine inductive argument. A partial model is a model of L T where all predicate symbols are allowed to be partially interpreted. It should be clear how to define validity in such models according to the Strong Kleene scheme. Since we are soon going to restrict partiality to the non-arithmetical by suitable additional initial sequents and rules, there is no need to be more precise here for our purposes.
Also completeness proofs exist for several systems designed for various concepts of logical consequence in Strong Kleene logic; see Aoyama [1] , Cleave [5] , Kearns [16] and Wang [32] . We do not give a completeness proof here.
4.2. Arithmetic. Since PKF will contain PA we add the additional sequents ⇒ ϕ where ϕ is an axiom of PA except for the induction axioms.
We could also allow all induction axioms of L PA as initial sequents. But we also want to extend induction to the language with the truth predicate. Therefore we postulate the stronger:
t is here an arbitrary term, ϕ some formula of L T . x must not occur freely in ϕ(0), Γ or ∆, but the term t is allowed to contain x.
Truth.
There have been various attempts to set up a formal system for Kripke's fixed point semantics. Michael Kremer [17] has presented a system in the sequent calculus with aims that differ from ours. He adopts a derivability relation of the kind mentioned above. But his theory does not comprise arithmetic or a comparable system for expressing syntactical facts.
We add now additional initial sequents corresponding to the axioms of KF. For an explanation of the notation see again the note preceding the list of KF axioms in Section 1.
This concludes the description of PKF. §5. Some basic facts on PKF. Each axiom of KF has been split up into two initial sequents of PKF, because the sequent arrow ⇒ has only one direction. apart from this, however, the axioms for PKF are easier to formulate than the axioms for KF because separate rules for negated conjunctions, disjunctions etc. are not required. The sequents corresponding to the axioms of KF for negated connectives and quantifiers can be proved in PKF.
Lemma 11. The following sequents are derivable in PKF.
PKF7(ii) corresponds to CONS. In PKF we have in addition the converse 'completeness' direction. PKF7 also plays the crucial rôle in the trivial proof of Lemma 11, which we skip.
For later use we prove the following:
The following rule is admissible in PKF:
In the following we write PKF ϕ if and only if the sequent ⇒ ϕ is derivable in PKF.
Lemma 13 (soundness). If PKF ϕ, then ϕ holds in all fixed point models.
Outline of Proof. In order to prove the lemma one shows by induction on the length of derivations the following stronger claim:
If Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable, then the two following conditions obtain for all fixed point models M and assignments b:
• If all formulas in Γ are true in M at b, then at least one formula in ∆ is true in M at b.
• If all formulas in ∆ are false in M at b, then at least one formula in ∆ is false in M at b. We do not go through the numerous initial sequents and the rules. The proof will later be formalized in a subtheory of KF in Theorem 20.
In PKF the T-sentences for arbitrary formulas of L T are not derivable by the previous lemma. For arithmetical sentences, however, they are provable. Lemma 14. PKF ∀ x(T ϕ(˙ x) ↔ ϕ( x)) for all arithmetical formulas ϕ( x) with the indicated free variables.
This can be proved by a meta-induction on the buildup of ϕ( x) using the initial sequents of PKF.
For arbitrary sentences we do not get the T-sentences, but only a corresponding rule:
Theorem 15. For all sentences ϕ ∈ L T : ϕ is provable in PKF if and only if T ϕ is provable in PKF.
Proof. The result that is actually shown is somewhat stronger. One shows that Γ ⇒ ϕ( x), ∆ is provable if and only if Γ ⇒ T ϕ(˙ x) , ∆ is provable in PKF.
x is the string of variables free in ϕ. The dot indicates that the variables have been formally replaced by the respective numerals.
The proof proceeds then on the buildup of ϕ and its negation. We suppress the inactive formulas. Let s( x) and t( y) be terms with the indicated free variables. Then the claim is established for the atomic case in the following way:
We have been somewhat sloppy: The first step involves a more lengthy reasoning in PA. The second step is also abbreviated and needs some additional steps involving identity axioms. We allow ourselves such abbreviations also in the following.
The derivation also can be inverted, and it obviously works for negated identity statements as well.
If ϕ is an atomic formula of the form T t or a negation of such a formula, PKF6 can be used. For the negated formulas of the form T t Lemma 11.7 can be employed.
If ϕ is a doubly negated formula Lemma 11.2 is employed. Next we consider as an example the case that ϕ is a negated conjunction ¬(ψ( x) ∧ χ( y)):
Again, the deduction is also sound if it is read from bottom to top. The remaining cases with connectives and quantifiers are treated in a similar way. For the quantifier cases we need in the induction hypothesis that ϕ may contain free variable.
The closure under NEC and CONEC, that is, the identity of inner an outer logic was of course the main point for considering the system PKF in the first place. For Theorem 15 shows that the inner and outer logic of PKF -in contrast to KF -coincide. In fact, the argument proves a stronger statement. It shows that all extensions of PKF by additional axioms have the property of being closed under the Necessitation and the Conecessitation rule.
In section 2 we have considered the special rôle of the consistency axiom CONS in KF. There we argued that CONS allows us to distribute the truth predicate over the conditional. PKF also allows the truth predicate to be distributed over the conditional, although this holds -like every law in partial logic-only as a rule of inference.
Lemma 16. PKF proves the sequents
for all sentences ϕ and ψ of L T . Therefore if PKF T ϕ → ψ obtains, we have also PKF T ϕ → T ψ .
Proof. ϕ → ψ is defined as ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. PKF3 yields T ¬ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ T ¬ϕ ∨ T ψ Applying PKF7 we obtain the following:
which yields one half the lemma. The other direction is proved by reading the above proof from bottom to top. 
Like KF, PKF does not have either of these properties:
Proposition 18. PKF does not have DP and NEP.
Proof. We only consider DP; the argument for NEP is similar. By Lemma 13, PKF is consistent. Con PKF does not contain the truth predicate.
PKF Con
On the one hand, if PKF T Con PKF we have by Theorem 15 also PKF Con PKF , which is impossible by Gödel's second theorem. On the other hand, PKF T ¬Con PKF implies PKF ¬Con PKF contradicting the soundness of PKF. §6. The proof-theoretic strength of PKF.
6.1. The upper bound. In this section we shall provide an upper bound for the proof-theoretic strength of PKF. We employ a result by Cantini [2] . In this paper Cantini studies a classical system BT that is equivalent to KF without CONS and with the induction scheme replaced by the following single axiom of "internal" induction.
We call this system BT.
We shall show that PKF can be embedded in BT in a sense to be specified below. In combination with Cantini's proof-theoretic analysis of BT, this will yield an upper bound for the proof-theoretic strength of PKF.
For the embedding we need the following lemma:
Proof. We apply the well known trick that is also used for showing that Π n and Σ n -induction are equivalent. Subtraction − is defined in PA in the usual way; if n < k the difference n − k is stipulated to be 0.
We reason in BT as follows. For a reductio as absurdum assume
From the induction axiom of BT we obtain: (3) and (6) For finite non-empty sets Γ of sentences Γ is the conjunction of all elements of Γ, Γ is their disjunction. If Γ is empty, Γ is 0 = 0 and Γ is ¬0 = 0.
We now formalize the soundness theorem 10 in BT.
The variables x are the free variables in Γ and ∆.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the proof in PKF. We give only some examples.
As an example for an initial sequent we choose PKF7 (ii), that is, Sent x, ¬ T x ⇒ T ¬ . x. We have to show two claims corresponding to parts (i) and (ii) of the theorem respectively:
To prove (7) we proceed as follows:
We skip the proof of (8), which is similar. The most interesting rule is induction:
In the following we do not mention the additional free variables of Γ, ∆ and ϕ(x) in order to keep the presentation more transparent. The induction hypothesis is
We do not show that the translation corresponding to (i) of the theorem is derivable, but proceed directly to (ii).
We start with (10):
The last line shows that the translation of Γ, ϕ(0) ⇒ ϕ(t), ∆ corresponding to claim (ii) of the Theorem is derivable.
Corollary 21. Every arithmetical sentence provable in PKF is also provable in BT.
Proof. If ⇒ ϕ is provable for an arithmetical sentence ϕ in PKF, then KF T ϕ by Theorem 20. This implies KF ϕ by Lemma 5, because ϕ is arithmetical. This concludes the reduction of PKF to BT.
Actually, a variation on this line of argumentation shows even more:
Corollary 22. Every sentence provable in PKF is also provable in BT plus CONS.
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Proof. If a sentence ⇒ ϕ is provable PKF, then BT proves T ϕ . But a straightforward induction on the buildup of formulas shows that BT plus CONS proves T ϕ → ϕ for every sentence ϕ. Therefore BT plus CONS proves ϕ. This raises the question whether PKF is identical with the inner logic of BT plus CONS.
In [2] determined the strength of BT:
Theorem 23 (Cantini [2] ). BT is proof-theoretically equivalent to ramified analysis RA <ω ω up to ω ω .
From this we obtain an upper bound for PKF:
Theorem 24. Every arithmetical sentence provable in PKF is also provable in RA <ω ω .
Lower bound.
Interpreting classical systems in PKF is nontrivial because PKF is formulated in partial logic. PKF behaves classically on a sublanguage of L T . In this section we shall show that the classical part of PKF is sufficient for interpreting RA <ω ω . Together with Theorem 24 this shows that PKF is equivalent to RA <ω ω ; both theories prove the same arithmetical sentences and can be interpreted in each another.
We shall interpret RA <ω ω in PKF by showing that ramified truth predicates up to level ω ω can be defined in PKF and that all sentences involving these ramified truth predicates satisfy classical logic in PKF. We also need to show that the truth predicates T α are 'Tarskian' truth predicates for the language that contains only truth predicates T β with β < α.
To this we need a notation system for the ordinals α < ω ω . We do not give the details of such a notation system and use the ordinals freely in PKF.
We now define sublanguages of L T with ramified truth predicates recursively. The language L 0 is the language L PA of arithmetic. L α+1 is the language L α expanded by the predicate T α x := T x ∧ x ∈ L α , and at limit levels L λ is the union of all languages L α with α < λ. That is, in the languages L α+1 the truth predicate is restricted to sentences where the truth predicate is iterated α-times.
The formula Sent α (x) expresses in L PA that x is a sentence of the language L α .
The main challenge for recovering a classical hierarchy of truth theories up to any level ω ω consists in proving that PKF behaves classically on the languages
The logic PKF is separated from classical logic only by the absence of a rule that allows to shift formulas back and forth from the antecedent to the succedent and vice versa by affixing a negation symbol to the formula. We shall show that shifting formulas in this way is permissible for all formulas in L ω ω . Actually we shall establish a slightly stronger claim in PKF, namely that PKF proves for every sentence of L α (α < ω) that either the sentence itself or its negation is true. The proof proceeds by induction on α and side induction on the complexity of the sentence.
We start with a trivial observation.
Lemma 25. If ⇒ ϕ, ¬ϕ is derivable in PKF, then the following two rules are derived rules of PKF:
Proof. The first rule can be established by an application of the cut rule:
For the second rule we employ the ¬¬-sequent and the ¬-rule:
First we prove that arithmetical formulas, that is, formulas from L 0 behave classically in PKF.
Lemma 26. ⇒ ϕ, ¬ϕ is derivable in PKF for arithmetical ϕ.
Proof. The claim is established by an induction on the complexity of ϕ. First we prove the claim for atomic formulas (cf. Scott [28, p. 19] ), that is, for formulas s = t, where s and t are terms. The leftmost line in the following proof is an initial sequent by =2; the rightmost is a law of negation.
Thus the claim is proved for all atomic ϕ ∈ L 0 = L PA . As an example we show the claim for conjunctions. Thus ⇒ ϕ, ¬ϕ and ⇒ ψ, ¬ψ hold by induction hypothesis. The first line is (∧2).
Similarly, we derive ⇒ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ), ψ and proceed as follows:
We skip the other cases.
For future reference, we state the following lemma that has been announced above and follows directly from Lemmata 26 and 25:
Corollary 27. If ϕ is arithmetical, then the following two rules are derived rules of PKF:
Since these two rules are the only rules that are missing from classical logic, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 28. Classical Peano arithmetic PA restricted to the language L PA is a subsystem of PKF.
Proof. This follows from Corollary 27. In the presence of classical logic the unrestricted induction rule IND yields all induction axioms.
As announced above we are going to prove
formally in PKF for all α < ω ω by transfinite induction on α and side induction on the complexity of x. The side induction is covered by the following lemma:
Lemma 29. The following sequents are provable in PKF:
Proof. As an example we prove (iv). We abbreviate Var(v), For(x, v) as Γ(x, v).
For the third line we rely on Lemma 12.
The other cases can be dealt with in a similar manner. According to the conventions introduced above, Sent 0 (x) expresses that x is a sentence of the language L 0 = L PA . We now prove claim (11) for α = 0.
Proof. The lemma is proved by a formal induction on the buildup of x. The induction step is covered by Lemma 29; so we only need to prove the claim for the atomic sentences of L PA . They are all of the form s = t for closed terms s and t. So we can employ PKF1(i):
Similarly we can use PKF1(ii): Lemma 31. The following sequent is provable in PKF:
Proof. We start with PKF6(i):
Similarly we employ PKF6(ii):
Combining both yields by Lemma 12 the sequent
From this one easily obtains the following:
Finally we employ Lemma 29 to establish the claim by formal induction on the buildup of x. This implies also the following lemma:
Proof. If β is a successor ordinal this follows from the previous lemma. If β is a limit ordinal, the claim can be proved in a straightforward way because L β is the union of all L α with α < β. In order to prove (11) from the previous lemma, we need to show transfinite induction up to any ordinal α < ω ω . The general scheme of transfinite induction is not provable in PKF. The corresponding rule, however, is provable.
Lemma 33. The following rule is a derived rule in PKF for any given natural numbers k:
Proof. The following proof is hardly innovative. However, we present the proof of transfinite induction in some detail, because it has to be carried out in the non-classical system PKF: care is needed when carrying out arguments familiar from classical logic in partial logic.
In the following we suppress Γ and ∆. In order to distinguish addition and multiplication on ordinals in the language L T from addition and multiplication on natural numbers we circle the former; thus ⊕ and are (formalizations of) functions pertaining to (codes of) ordinal numbers.
There is a function that sends any given natural number to the code of the corresponding ordinal. This function is expressed in L T by [. . . ] We assume that the following sequent is provable in PKF ∀α < β ϕ(α) ⇒ ϕ(β) (13) and show from this by metainduction on k that for every natural number k the following is provable in PKF:
ω k is fixed here, it is a numeral for a code of the respective ordinal. Therefore we do not have to apply the operation [. . . ] and we do not have to overline k.
The case k = 0 is trivial: from (13) and
using some properties of ordinals in PKF we obtain
This covers the case k = 0 because ω 0 = 1. The induction step is established in the following way:
Now we can prove (11) by applying Lemma 33 to Lemma 32:
Corollary 35. The set of sentences in L ω ω provable in PKF is closed under classical logic.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 34 and Lemma 25. Corollary 35 shows that we can relatively interpret classical systems in PKF as long as the range of the interpretation does not not exceed the language L ω ω .
In the next theorem we shall show that the truth predicates T α behave like ramified truth predicates.
Theorem 36. PKF proves the following theorems for all α < ω ω :
Proof. By Corollary 35 and Lemma 25 we can freely shift formulas in L ω ω between the antecedent and the succedent. Thus the above clauses are easily obtained from the rules PKF1-PKF8 of PKF.
Theorem 36 shows that PKF interprets a system of ramified truth up to any ordinal below ω ω . Systems of ramified truth were mentioned by Feferman [9] (more explicitly in draft versions of this paper) and studied by Halbach [13] . It is known that ramified analysis RA <α (α ≤ 0 )) is equivalent to a system of ramified truth RT <α as described in Halbach [13] . This just generalizes the well known result that the theory of arithmetical comprehension ACA is equivalent to 'Tarksian' truth (see Feferman [9] or Halbach [13]) to transfinite iterations of these theories. Finally Theorem 36 proves that RT <ω ω is a subtheory of PKF. We skip the details.
Theorem 37. Ramified truth RT <ω ω and ramified analysis RA <ω ω up to any level below ω ω and PKF prove the same arithmetical sentences. §7. PKF and classical logic. The philosophical significance of the prooftheoretic analysis of PKF depends on whether PKF is actually equivalent to all natural systems for Kripke's theory. The claim could fail in two ways: First there could be natural axiomatizations of Kripke's theory that are stronger than PKF; second PKF could already exceed the strength of all natural axiomatizations.
Concerning the first possibility, we are fairly confident that PKF cannot be naturally enriched by further initial sequents and rules such that a stronger system is obtained. This is not a mathematically provable claim because the notion of a natural extension is not mathematically defined. It seems at least that PKF naturally captures the compositional nature of truth in Kripke's theory and allows to iterate truth in a straightforward. Thus it seems the essential truththeoretic intuitions behind Kripke's theory are captured in PKF. Thus it seems implausible to us to assume the existence of formalizations of Kripke's theory that properly extend PKF.
Concerning the second possibility-that PKF is actually too strong-one might argue that PKF achieves its proof-theoretic strength only through a noniterable connective that does not obey the rules of Strong Kleene logic. For instance, ϕ ⇒ ϕ is derivable for all formulas ϕ of L T , even for the liar sentence. This use of the sequent arrow, it might be argued, is as bad as the full surrender to classical logic in KF. At any rate, one might claim, a classical device is employed, and the only difference between KF and PKF is that the truth predicate is classical in KF, while PKF uses a classical connective.
In order to avoid this objection, we could have presented PKF in a natural deduction system, as mentioned above. Such a system would differ from classical logic in not allowing an unrestricted rule for introducing material implication →. Now another objection against PKF might be raised: Feferman rejected the use of partial logic with seemingly good reasons. Strong Kleene logic seems simply impractical. Passing from classical logic to partial logic seems to be a price much too high for a solution of the liar paradox.
Our reply essentially resembles Kripke's defense of partial logic. For the language L PA we retain classical logic, as was shown in Corollary 28. We do not propose to carry out arithmetic in partial logic. Only when the problematic truth predicate is added, we have to give up classical reasoning. Our proof-theoretic analysis in the previous section has added another aspect that supports this line of defense: The fragment of PKF that contributes to its proof-theoretic strength is purely classical. As has been shown in the previous section one could completely dispense with partial logic by employing truth predicates with type indices. Feferman's KF is a further alternative: he regains classical logic without typing the truth predicate; but his KF describes a partial truth predicate that is very different from the actual classical semantics of KF. §8. Truth and the reflective closure of PA. In this section we speculate on some consequences of our results for Feferman's proposal to employ KF as a system for capturing the reflective closure of PA. We start with a very brief sketch of the main motivation for considering the reflective closure of theories.
It has been argued that the acceptance of Peano arithmetic commits us also implicitly to the acceptance of a stronger system. For instance the acceptance of PA commits us also to the acceptance of PA plus the consistency statement of PA or the uniform reflection principle for PA, which in turn commits us to the consistency (or reflection) of this theory and so on. This addition of consistency statements and reflection principles can be iterated into the transfinite along those ordinals for which transfinite induction can be proved. Since the resulting systems will prove stronger instances of transfinite induction, the process can be driven further through so called autonomous progressions (see Feferman [7] . Here we concentrate on the simple closure.
Feferman has made several proposals for determining exactly to what we are committed by the acceptance of PA. Iterating consistency statements only will be too weak and reflections principles can be iterated as well. The system containing all assumptions implicit in the acceptance of PA has been called the reflective closure of PA.
A particular method for describing the reflective closure would be the iteration of the usual 'Tarskian' theory of truth. This leads to the hierarchy RT α of truth theories. Like other theories of this kind (e.g., ramified analysis), the Tarskian theory of truth can be iterated up to 0 (or further to Γ 0 in an autonomous reflection process).
Iterating reflection or comprehension principles or truth theories and the like usually relies on some notation system of the ordinals along which these principles are iterated (see Feferman [7] , [8] and many further articles). These ordinals and the corresponding notations are explicitly used in the presentation of the reflective closure.
Feferman has tried to describe the reflective closure of PA (and other system) by systems that do not make explicit use of ordinals and notation systems. KF is such a system. Feferman [9, In contrast to the systems RT α of ramified truth, the presentation of KF does not require truth predicates indexed by ordinal notations; rather KF has only one single type-free truth predicate.
Thus it is tempting to see KF as a system that captures the content of the reflective closure of PA in one swoop instead of approaching it by iterations and ramifications.
The proof-theoretic analysis of KF shows that the ordinal levels are still present in KF; but they are not explicit, rather they are only revealed by the analysis of the system. Therefore the system can be presented in a smooth way that does not require a notation system for ordinals, ramified languages or the like.
On the semantical side, Kripke's theory of truth might be seen as a type-free version of Tarski's hierarchy of truth predicates up to the first non-recursive ordinal. If KF is an axiomatization of Kripke's theory it should achieve the same as the axiomatization of the of ramified theory of truth RT 0 up to 0 . Of course in terms of proof-theoretic strength, KF is successful because it matches RT 0 .
However, our results above make it less plausible that KF only sums up what can also be achieved in many steps by ramified systems of truth. For KF is not an axiomatization of Kripke's theory of truth but rather of the 'closed off' version. In proving certain arithmetical sentences KF makes essential detours through truth-valueless territory, because it has the resources to distinguish between truth, falsity and indeterminateness, whereas on Kripke's original partial approach the lack of a truth value cannot be expressed within the language. KF is, so to speak, not an axiomatization of Kripke's theory of truth, but rather of large parts of its metatheory. If the resources for distinguishing between truth, falsity and indeterminateness are dropped and a thoroughly partial system is adopted, proof-theoretic strength is lost. PKF does not longer capture the content of RT 0 .
Theorem 37 shows that PKF can only reflect the iteration of Tarskian truth up any level below ω ω . Only the transition to classical logic, that is, to KF yields a system that exhausts the strength of the reflective closure of PA as characterized by the iteration RT 0 of Tarskian truth (or even of RT Γ0 in the case of Feferman's [9] Strong Reflective Closure). But KF is, as we have argued, neither a natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory nor can it be reduced to any such axiomatization. So we cannot see how an axiomatic theory of truth should form a useful tool in the analysis of the reflective closure: On the one hand PKF is intuitively a sound way to make explicit implicit assumptions. But only by 28 AXIOMATIZING KRIPKE'S THEORY OF TRUTH other reflective procedures strong theories can be obtained. PKF is therefore to weak to be useful for a characterization of the reflective closure of PA. KF (or one of its variants) is strong enough, but it brings commitments that are not implicit in the acceptance of PA. §9. Comparison with other axiomatic theories of truth. If PKF is actually the natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory of truth, then the status of axiomatizations of Kripke's theory among other systems of truth must be reassessed.
PKF still allows to prove transfinite iterations of truth. In this respect it fares better than classical theories of truth. The strongest thoroughly classical theory of truth to date is the Friedman-Sheard system FS.
13 The arithmetical strength of FS is given by the theory RA <ω or a ramified theory of truth with finitely many levels. Thus, FS is mathematically much weaker than PKF. But of course there is a price to pay: PKF is a decidedly nonclassical system. This seems to be the price for having transfinite iterations of truth. KF hides this fact because it is formulated in classical logic and yields iterations of truth up to 0 , but this is only achieved by the trick of 'closing off'; internally KF relies on partial logic, which creates the inacceptable asymmetries between inner and outer logic.
Kripke's theory with the Strong Kleene scheme has a distinctive compositional flavor in contrast to the version with supervaluations, which clearly fails to be compositional. Therefore KF has been advocated as a strong compositional theory of type-free truth. It has been conjectured that KF and its variants including Feferman's Strong Reflective Closure of PA might demarcate the limits of compositional truth. A straightforward axiomatization of Kripke's theory with supervaluations exceeds this limits; it is as strong as the theory ID 1 of non-iterated inductive definitions, as Cantini [3] has shown. Halbach [14] has conjectured that the limits of compositionality thus coincide with the limits of predicativity. For no compositional theory exceeds the strength of RA <Γ0 , while Feferman's Strong Reflective Closure of PA exhausts the strength of predicative analysis RA <Γ0 . Our consideration shed some doubt on this picture: we deny that KF and its variants are satisfactory theories of truth. Moreover the presence of CONS renders KF a non-compositional theory, as we have argued in the light of Remark 4, which shows that KF decides the liar sentence and that KF proves a sentence whose truth does not rely on the semantic status of its components in KF. If our rejection of KF as a satisfactory compositional theory of truth is justified, then PKF would assume the rôle of the strongest type-free theory of truth on the market that is still compositional.
As mentioned above, Feferman [9] considers also a variant of KF, the Strong Reflective Closure of PA, which has the strength of RA <Γ0 or iterated truth RT <Γ0 up to Γ 0 . One could try to define a system that relates to PKF in the way the Strong Reflective Closure Ref * (PA) of PA relates to the Weak Reflective Closure Ref(PA) in [9] . One could expect that thereby the proof-theoretic strength of PKF can be increased.
